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jurisdictions. The risk that the gametes have been gained in coercive or exploitative situations 
is a real one. The right of any child born of donated gametes to know his or her genetic origins 
also precludes sourcing anonymous gametes. Willing, registered donors are required regardless 
of whether gametes are imported or donated locally. It may be possible to extend the range of 
potential donors beyond New Zealand borders if a similarly regulated system was willing to 
export gametes.
 However, on the matter of payment and exploitation we differ from Parker with respect 
to both gametes and surrogacy. We have argued elsewhere that altruistic surrogacy is also 
exploitative and risks commodification of the woman and the baby (Van Zyl & Walker, 2013). 
Whether or not surrogacy amounts to commodification of babies depends on what is being 
donated or given: the baby or the committed service of the woman who carries it. If the baby 
is the gift, then commodification occurs whether she is paid or not. If it is her time and service 
that she is giving, then commodification is avoided whether she is paid or not. Similarly, in 
egg donation the worry is that if she is paid it will be for the eggs. However, in each case 
the women involved undergo significantly risky and unpleasant procedures over an extended 
period of time. If we paid them for time and service then we would avoid commodification. 
There are good reasons for thinking that the women should be paid.
 A surrogate mother gives a large amount of time to the project, and egg donation also 
requires more than popping into the clinic to have the eggs harvested. In altruistic surrogacy 
and donation these women receive no compensation for the risks they run or the time they 
spend. Taking Stephen Wilkinson’s (2003) view of exploitation – the unjust distribution of 
harms and benefits without valid consent – we argue that altruistic surrogacy and egg donation 
are exploitative. It is often argued that women do give consent to be donors or surrogates and 
so are not being exploited. However, we argue that it is questionable whether this consent is 
valid. If these women strongly desire to help people whose infertility prevents them forming 
a family they have to consent to an altruistic arrangement or not donate at all. It may be a 
technically valid consent in that they understand the risks and are fully informed, but it is not 
an entirely free consent given the conditions of participation. The unjust distribution is very 
clear: all the harms accrue to the donor and all the benefits to the recipient. The only way to 
redress the balance is to compensate the donors.
 It is important to understand that compensation for surrogates and egg donors does not 
equate to a market in wombs and eggs as so many commentators fear. A robust regulatory 
framework would control the fees and the way the services are delivered in order to protect 
women’s rights and health. 
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Surrogacy in New Zealand is treated as a form of adoption. ACART (2014) proposes that the 
Health Minister consider compensating women who act as surrogate mothers. We think this 
is a step in the right direction, but until the adoption model is abandoned surrogacy will not 
be a safe practice for New Zealanders. ACART’s consultation document does not address the 
issue of legal parenthood, but it is one that is intimately linked to the issue of compensation 
to surrogates because the Adoption Act (Section 25) prohibits payments in consideration of 
adoption. If, as we will argue below, surrogates deserve to be compensated for their labour, it 
is imperative that we acknowledge that the adoption framework is inappropriate in surrogacy.
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 The HART Act (Section 14.1) states that ‘[a] surrogacy arrangement is not itself illegal, 
but is not enforceable by or against any person’. Although people are free to enter surrogacy 
arrangements, any previous agreement regarding legal parenthood will not be enforced. Instead, 
legal parenthood is determined in accordance with the Status of Children Act 1969 (as amended 
in 1987 and 2004). Section 17 states that if a woman conceives with donor gametes, she is for 
all purposes the mother of the child, and Section 18 states that if a woman’s partner consents to 
the ART procedure, he will be the parent of the resultant child. The implication for surrogacy 
arrangements is that the surrogate and her partner will be the legal parents at birth. She can 
then decide whether to give the child up for adoption by the intended parents. Effectively, 
surrogacy in New Zealand operates as a form of adoption, despite the fact that it has two rather 
distinct features: the surrogate becomes pregnant with the intention of relinquishing the child; 
and one or both of the adoptive parents is also the biological parent of the child. According to 
the Adoption Act 1955 the birth mother is not legally able to give consent until at least 10 days 
after the birth of the child (Section 7). Like any other person who wishes to adopt a child, the 
intended parents will have to be vetted by Child, Youth and Family (CYF), and an adoption 
order will only be approved if the court is satisfied that the adoptive parents are fit and proper 
persons to raise the child (Section 11). 
 Prior to the 1987 Amendment parenthood in New Zealand was grounded in genetic 
connection. In law, a gamete donor was a legal parent, despite the fact that he or she did not 
want the rights, duties and liabilities of parenthood. The 1987 Amendment was motivated 
by the belief that parentage ‘should be decided on a social rather than a biological basis’ 
(Henaghan & Atkin, 2013, p. 270). The Amendment achieved the desired result for couples 
who use donor gametes to overcome infertility, but in our view it achieved the opposite in 
the case of surrogacy, where the surrogate and her partner are recognised as the legal parents, 
while the intended parents, who are also the genetic parents, are treated as gamete donors. That 
appears to have been the intended result. The 1987 Amendment was promoted, at least in part, 
to prevent a Baby M case in New Zealand.2 Opponents of surrogacy used this case to support 
their view that a woman cannot possibly decide ahead of time whether she would be capable 
of relinquishing her baby at birth. The introduction of the 1987 Amendment was aimed at 
protecting women by recognising the birth mother as the legal mother, regardless of whether 
she entered a surrogacy arrangement, and regardless of whether the child was genetically 
related to her. 
 The old adage ‘hard cases make bad law’ applies to surrogacy legislation both here and 
abroad. There is now sufficient evidence that the vast majority of surrogacy arrangements 
run smoothly. Women who become surrogates do decide in advance to give the baby to the 
intended parents and do relinquish the baby. That is the only reason they became pregnant. We 
believe that the law should change, and that intended parents should be recognised as the legal 
parents at birth. This would serve the interests of all parties to the agreement. 
 The HART Act aims to protect surrogates but actually makes them vulnerable, because the 
intended parents can also change their minds about adopting the child, or the Family Court 
may not grant an adoption order in their favour. Indeed, ACART (2013, p. 2) accepts this as a 
major risk factor for the surrogate. We believe it is an unacceptable risk to bear. In particular, if 
the child is born with an abnormality the surrogate may find herself responsible for a child that 
she cannot raise without significant hardship to herself and her family. Putting that child up for 
adoption by strangers is her only other option.
 The intended parents are especially vulnerable given that ACART requires that at least one 
of them is the genetic parent of the intended baby. This genetic status is never again formally 
acknowledged. Should the surrogate change her mind about relinquishing the child or the 
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Family Court not grant an adoption order in their favour they face the loss of their genetic child. 
We do not want to suggest that the child is their property because it is their biological issue, but 
wish to highlight the horror for them of having a child to whom they are closely related raised 
by non-relatives who may not even maintain contact. New Zealand makes strenuous efforts 
to find family members to foster children who are taken from their biological parents, but in 
surrogacy this principle seems to have no force. 
 Even where the adoption process ends up running smoothly, the knowledge that either party 
can change their mind introduces a huge amount of fear and uncertainty into the relationship. 
Much of the uncertainty, as well as the fear and mistrust this can engender, will be eliminated 
by making surrogacy agreements legally binding. In addition to the benefits that certainty about 
legal parenthood would have for both the intended parents and the surrogate, it also serves 
the interests of the resulting child, for it will eliminate the risk that the child will ‘become 
the subject of a dispute if the relationship between the surrogate and the intending parent(s) 
breaks down’ (ACART, 2013, p. 2). The interests of the child are not being taken seriously 
in a system that maintains the fiction that the birth mother is the mother and the intended 
parents merely another couple applying for adoption under the 1955 Adoption Act. Adoption is 
a service that aims to find permanent legal parents for a child whose parents, family or whanau 
are unable to care for the child. As noted by Henderson (2013, p. 43), this does not encompass 
the motivations behind surrogacy arrangements. 
 A further undesirable consequence of retaining the adoption framework for surrogacy is a 
lack of procreative privacy for the intended parents. They are forced into the most public way 
of becoming parents: permitted by the state to adopt a child following suitability tests that 
assume the child is not theirs. They must participate in the fiction that the baby is not their 
child, even if they are its genetic parents, unless the state says it is. The state can only grant 
them parental status if the surrogate relinquishes a baby that is not hers. We do not object 
to suitability tests in themselves and support some screening of intended parents as well as 
surrogates, but it should be done before any surrogacy arrangement is validated. Once the 
agreement is confirmed the state should not play a role in the fate of the child. The intended 
parents should be the legal parents from birth and the surrogate should not be able to renege on 
the agreement at that point.
 Section 14(3) of the HART Act prohibits commercial surrogacy, holding that it will be an 
offence to give or receive valuable consideration in exchange for participation in a surrogacy 
arrangement. Commercial surrogacy is widely condemned on the grounds that payment 
commodifies babies and exploits women. However, we argue that what makes commercial 
surrogacy morally wrong (when it is wrong) are practices such as:
• A failure to obtain free and informed consent before entering the arrangement;
• Restriction of the surrogate’s freedom during pregnancy;
• Violation or restriction of her right to make decisions that may affect her health, including 
whether to terminate the pregnancy, have selective termination or even have a natural or 
caesarean delivery; 
• Providing inadequate health care, which can lead to high rates of late miscarriage or 
perinatal death and premature birth;
• Transferring more than two embryos, which results in a high incidence of multiple 
pregnancies.3 
New Zealanders should be strongly discouraged from seeking out commercial surrogacy 
services overseas, but this should be accompanied by an attempt to make domestic surrogacy 
more attractive to both infertile couples and potential surrogates. The prohibition of commercial 
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surrogacy is based on the mistaken assumption that payment of surrogates amounts to 
embracing a crude business or contractual model, which typically has the following features:
• The aim is to make a profit, and both parties are motivated by self-interest;
• A competitive market is encouraged: providers compete with each other to offer clients 
the most attractive deal;
• It is based on the principle ‘Let the buyer beware’;
• Clients ‘get what they pay for’.
The contractual model inevitably leads to the unsafe practices listed above. Fortunately it is 
not the only model for paid surrogacy. We argue that not paying surrogates is unfair and a form 
of exploitation in itself. Instead, we have developed a professional model in which surrogates 
are motivated by a desire to do something worthwhile but are nevertheless compensated for 
their labour (see Van Zyl & Walker, 2013; Walker & Van Zyl, 2015). It is widely accepted 
that the work done by members of other caring professions – such as taking care of the sick 
and vulnerable – is in some sense priceless, but people still expect to be compensated for their 
labour. To guard against exploitation of surrogates and other harmful and unethical practices we 
favour the creation of a professional body, which will have the task of screening and registering 
surrogates, regulating fees, and licensing and monitoring clinics that offer surrogacy services. 
Licensed clinics will be required to use registered surrogates and provide all support services 
that the parties may need at any time during the arrangement (including post-natally).
 Commercial surrogacy is often opposed on the grounds that the child is treated as a 
commodity: the surrogate is paid to hand over her child to the commissioning parents. What is 
less often noticed is that altruistic or unpaid surrogacy also commodifies the child – this time 
as a gift. 
 Instead of viewing surrogacy as a form of adoption, we favour viewing it as a way of 
overcoming infertility: the surrogate makes it possible for an infertile couple to have their own 
child. The intended parents are not buying a child, nor are they receiving it as a gift. Instead, a 
woman who is able to is providing the gestation of their own child. This requires a fundamental 
shift in the legal approach to surrogacy in New Zealand, but would align regulation more 
closely with the way in which participants usually view it. It is quite common for a surrogate 
not to think of the developing foetus as her own. Intended parents, in turn, rightfully think of 
the baby as theirs from the outset, which makes it particularly reprehensible that the surrogate 
has the freedom to change her mind. The intended mother is in the same position as the genetic 
father in more traditional arrangements: someone else is pregnant with, and gives birth to, her 
child.
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The 2013 documentary After Tiller 4 follows the only four remaining doctors in the United 
States who openly perform late-term (third trimester) abortions following the murder of their 
colleague Dr George Tiller by an anti-abortion activist in 2009. The film follows the doctors’ 
daily lives and work as they negotiate the complex ethical issues presented by third trimester 
abortion, whether for fetal abnormality or for any other reason leading to the pregnancy no 
longer being a tenable option for the woman concerned. They do this in the midst of hostile 
oppositional forces including threats to their safety, and social, structural and legislative 
barriers that would see them prevented from providing care to women who present to their 
services as a last resort, and often in desperate circumstances. In the course of the film, the 
